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The End of Aesthetic Experience
Experience, quipped Oscar Wilde, is the name one gives to one's
mistakes. Does aesthetic experience then name the central blunder of
modern aesthetics? Though long considered the most essential of
aesthetic concepts, as including but also surpassing the realm of art,
aesthetic experience has in the last half-centllry come under
increasing critique. Not only its value bllt its very existence has been
questioned. How has this once vital concept lost its appeal; does it
still offer anything ofvalue? The ambiguous title "the end of aesthetic
experience" suggests my two goals: a reasoned account of its demise
and an argument for reconceiving and thus redeeming its purpose.
Though I shall briefly note the continental critique of this
concept, I shall mostly focus on its progressive decline in twentieth-
centllry Anglo-American philosophy. Not only because here its
descent is most extreme hut hecause it is in this tradition -- that of
John Dewey, Monroe Beardsly, Nelson Goodman, and Arthur Danto-
- that I situate my own aesthetic work. While Dewey celebrated
aesthetic experience, making it the very center of his philosophy of
art, Danto virtually shuns the concept, warning (after Duchamp) that
its "aesthetic delectation is a danger to be avoided".1 The decline of
aesthetic experience from Dewey to Danto reflects, I shall argue, deep
confusion abollt this concept's diverse forms and theoretical
functions. But it also reflects a growlng preoccupation with the
anaesthetic thrust of this century's artistic avant-garde, itself
2symptomatic of much larger transformations in our basic sensibilty as
we move increasingly from an experiential to an informational
culture.
To appreciate the decline of the concept of aesthetic experience,
we must first recall its prime importance. Some see it as playing a
major role, avant la lettre and in diverse guises, in premodem
aesthetics (e.g. in Plato's, Aristotle's and Aquinas's accounts of the
experience of beauty, and in Alberti's and Gravina's concepts of
lentezza and delirio).2 But there can be no doubt that its dominance
was established in modemity, when the term "aesthetic" was
officially established. Once modem science and philosophy had
destroyed the classical, medieval, and Renaissance faith that
properties like beauty were objective features of the world, modern
aesthetics tumed to subjective experience to explain and ground
them. Even when seeking an intersubjective consensus or standard
that would do the critical job of realist objectivism, philosophy
typically identified the aesthetic not only through but with subjective
experience. "Beauty", says Hume in arguing for a standard of taste,
"is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the mind which
contemplates them", though some minds are, of course, more
judicious and allthoritative than others. Kant explicitly identifies the
subject's experience "of pleasure or displeasure" as "the determining
ground" of aesthetic judgement.3 The notion of aesthetic experience
moreover helped provide an umbrella concept for diverse qualities
that were distinguished from beauty but still closely related to taste
and art: concepts like the sublime and the picturesque.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, aesthetic
3experlence gained still greater importance through the general
celebration of experience by influential Lebensphilosophies aimed at
combatting the threat of mechanistic detenninism (seen not only in
science but in the ravages of industrialization). Experience here
replaced atomistic sensation as the basic epistemological concept, and
its link to vividly feIt life is clear not only from the Gennan tenn
"erlebenis" but from the vitalistic experiential theories of Bergson,
James, and Dewey. As art subsumed religion's role by providing a
non-supernatural spirituality in the material world, so experience
emerged as the natllralistic yet non-mechanistic expression of mind.
The union of art and experience engendered a notion of aesthetic
experience that achieved, through the turn of the century's great
aestheticist movement, enonnous cultural importance and almost
religious intensity. Aesthetic experience became the island of
freedom, beauty, and idealistic meaning in an otherwise coldly
materialistic and law-detennined world; it was the locus not only of
the highest pleasures but a means of spiritual conversion and
transcendence; it accordingly became the central concept for
explaining the distinctive nature and value of art, which had itself
become increasingly autonomous and isolated from the mainstream of
material life and praxis. The doctrine of arttor art's sake could only
mean that art was for the sake of its own experience. And seeking to
expand art's dominion, it argued that anything could be rendered art if
it could engender the appropriate experience.
This hasty genealogy of aesthetic experience does not, of course,
do justice to the complex development of this concept, to the variety
of theories and conceptions it embraces. But it should at least
4highlight four features that are central to the tradition of aesthetic
experience and whose interplay shapes yet confuses twentieth century
accounts of this concept. First, aesthetic experience is essentially
enjoyable and rewarding; call this its evaluative dimension. Second, it
is something vividly feIt and subjectively savored, affectively
absorbing us and focussing our attention in its immediate presence
and thus standing out from the ordinary flow of rOlltine experience;
call this its phenomenological dimension. Third, it is meaningful
experience, not mere sensation; call this its semantic dimension.
Fourth, it is a distinctive experience closely identified with the
distinction of fine art and representing art's essential ainl; call this the
demarcational-definitional dimension.
These features of aesthetic experience do not seem, prima facie,
collectively inconsistent. Yet, as we shall see, they generate
theoretical tensions that propel recent analytic philosophy toward
growing marginalization of this concept and have even inspired some
analysts -- most notably George Dickie --to deny its very existence.4
Before concentrating on the Anglo-American scene, we should note
the major lines of recent continental critique. For only by comparison
can we grasp the full meaSllre of the analytic depreciation of aesthetic
experlence.
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From the Frankfurt school to hermene.utics and deconstruction, the
continental critique of aesthetic experience has focussed mostlyon
challenging its radical demarcation and its phenomenological
5immediacy. The next section of this paper shows how these two main
critical thrusts are developed in the theories of Adorno, Benjamin,
Gadamer, and deconstruction. But lacking the time to present them,
let me simply summarize their best arguments. First, aesthetic
experience cannot be conceived as an unchanging concept narrowly
identified with fine art's purely autonomous reception. For not only is
such reception impoverished, but aesthetic experience extends weIl
beyond fine art (to nature and festivals for example). Moreover, it is
conditioned by changes in the non-artistic world that affect our very
capacities for experience. The second charge, that aesthetic
experience requires more than mere phenomenological immediacy to
achieve its full meaning is equally compelling. Immediate reactions
are often poor and mistaken, so interpretation is generally needed to
enhance our experience. Moreover, prior assumptions and habits of
perception, including prior acts of interpretation, are necessary
preconditions for aesthetic responses that are experienced as
immediate. This insistence on the interpretive is also the crux of the
Goodman-Danto critique of aesthetic experience. So when Gadamer
urges that "aesthetics must be absorbed into henneneutics" (TM 146),
he is expressing precisely the dominant analytic line. However, the
claim that aesthetic experlence must involve more than
phenomenological immediacy and vivid feeling does not entail that
such immediate feeling is not important to aesthetic experience.
The decline of aesthetic experience in analytic philosophy lS
partly the result of conflating these different propositions and
consequently depreciating affect. But it also stems from other
confusions arising from the changing role of this concept in Anglo-
6American philosophy from Dewey to Danto, and especially from the
fact that this diversity has not been adequately recognized. Viewed as
a univocal concept, aesthetic experience seems too hopelessly
confused to be redeemed as useful. So the first task is to articulate its
contrasting conceptions.
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These are best mapped in terms of three axes of contrast whose
opposing poles capture all four of the features already noted. Is the
concept of aesthetic experience intrinsically honorific or instead
descriptively neutral? Second, is it robustly phenomenological or
simply semantic? In other words, are affect and subjective
intentionality essential dimensions of this experience or is it rather
only a certain kind of meaning or style of symbolization that renders
an experience aesthetic? Third, is this concept's primary theoretical
function provocational-transformational, aiming to enlarge the
aesthetic field, or is it instead demarcational, i.e. to define, delimit,
and explain the aesthetic status quo?
My claim is that, since Dewey, Anglo-American theories of
aesthetic experience have moved steadily from the former to the
latter, resulting eventually in the concept's loss of power and interest.
In other words, Dewey's essentially evaluative, phenomenological,
and transformational notion of aesthetic experience has been
gradually replaced by a purely descriptive, semantic one whose chief
purpose is to explain and thus support the established demarcation of
art and aesthetics from other human domains. Such changes generate
7tensions that make the concept suspicious. Moreover, when aesthetic
experience seems in principle unable to discharge this definitional
duty, as Danto concludes, the whole concept is abandoned for one
that promises to perform this function -- interpretation. That aesthetic
experience may nonetheless be fruitful for other purposes is simply,
but I think wrongly ignored. To substantiate this line of narrative and
argument, we must examine the theories of Dewey, Beardsley,
Goodman and Danto.
Dewey's prime use of aesthetic experlence IS aimed not at
distinguishing art from the rest of life, but rather at "recovering the
continuity of its esthetic experience with the normal processes of
living", so that both art and life will be improved by their greater
integration.5 His goal was to break the stitling hold of what he called
"the museum conception of art" , which compartmentalizes the
aesthetic from real life, remitting it to aseparate realm remote from
the vital interests of ordinary men and women. This "esoteric idea of
fine art" gains power from the sacralization of art objects sequestered
in museums and private collections. Dewey therefore insisted on
privileging dynamic aesthetic experience over the physical objects
that conventional dogma identifies and then fetishizes as arte For
Dewey, the essence and value of art are not in such artifacts per se but
in the dynamic and developing experiential activity through which
they are created and perceived. He therefore distinguished between
the physical "art product" that once created can exist "apart from
human experience" and "the actual work of art [which] is what the
product does with and in experience" (AB 9,167;329). This primacy
of aesthetic experience not only frees art from object fetishization but
8also from confinement to the traditional domain of fine arte For
aesthetic experience clearly exceeds the limits of fine art, as, for
example, in the appreciation ofnature.6
Dewey insisted that aesthetic experience could likewise occur in
the pursllit of science and philosophy, in sport and haufe cuisine,
contributing much to the appeal of these practices. Indeed, it could be
achieved in virtually any domain of action, since all experience, to be
coherent and meaningful, required the germ of aesthetic unity and
development. By rethinking art in terms of aesthetic experience,
Dewey hoped we could radically enlarge and democratize the domain
of art, integrating it more' fully into the real world which would be
greatly improved by the pursuit of such manifold arts of living.
Its potential pervasiveness did not mean that aesthetic
experience could not be distinguished from ordinary experience. Its
distinction, however, is essentially qualitative. From the humdrum
flow of routine experience, it stands out, says Dewey, as a distinctly
memorable, rewarding whole -- as not just experience but "an
experience" -- because in it we feel "most alive" and fulfilled through
the active, satisfying engagement of all our human faculties (sensual,
emotive, and cognitive) that contribute to this integrated whole.
Aesthetic experience is differentiated not by its unique possession of
some specific element or its unique focus on some particular
dimension, but by its more zestful integration of all the elements of
ordinary experience into an integrated, absorbing, developing whole
that provides "a satisfyingly emotional quality" of some sort and so
exceeds the threshold of perception that it can be appreciated for its
own sake (AB 42,45,63).7 An essential part ofthat appreciation is the
9immediate, phenomenological feel of aesthetic experlence, whose
sense of unity, affect, and value is "directly fulfilling" rather than
deferred for some other time or end.
The transfonnational, phenomenological, and evaluative thrust
of Deweyan aesthetic experience should now be clear. So should the
usefulness of such a concept for provoking recognition of artistic
potentialites and aesthetic satisfactions in pursuits previously
considered nonaesthetic. It is further useful in reminding us that, even
in fine art, directly fulfilling experience rather than collecting or
scholarly criticism is the primary value. Nor does this emphasis on
phenomenological immediacy and affect preclude the semantic
dimension of aesthetic experience. [Meaning is not incompatible with
qualia and affect.]
Unfortunately, Dewey does not confine hirnself to
transfonnational provocation, but also proposes aesthetic experience
as a theoretical definition of arte By standard philosophical criteria,
this definition is hopelessly inadequate, grossly misrepresenting our
current concept of arte Much art, particularly bad art, fails to engender
Deweyan aesthetic experience, which, on the other hand, often arises
outside art's institutionallimits. Moreover, though the concept of art
(as a historically determined concept) can be somewhat reshaped, it
cannot be convincingly defined in such aglobaI way so as to be
coextensive with aesthetic experience. No matter how powerful and
universal is the aesthetic experience of sunsets, we are hardly going to
reclassify them as art.8 By employing the concept of aesthetic
experience both to define what art in fact is and to transfonn it into
something quite different, Dewey creates considerable confusion.
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Hence analytic philosophers typically dismissed his whole idea of
aesthetic experience as a disastrous muddle.
The major exception was Monroe Beardsley, who reconstructs
this concept as the core of his analytic philosophy of art, which, like
most analytic aesthetics was preoccupied with projects of
differentiation. Rather than Dewey's quest to unite art to the rest of
life, the aim was to clearly distinguish art and the aesthetic from other
practices. This meant renouncing the transformational use of aesthetic
experience. Instead this concept serves to define what is distinctive of
works of art and what is constitutive of their value [(issuing in what
Beardsley calls a "persuasive analysis ofartistic goodness",APV 79)].
Beardsley's strategy is to argue that art can be defined as a
distinctive function class, if there is a particular function that works
of art "can do that other things cannot do, or do as completely or
fully"(A 526). The production of aesthetic experience is claimed as
this function, and so we explain both the general value of art and the
differing value of its particular works through the basic value and
intrinsic pleasure of that experience; better works, for Beardsley, are
those capable of producing "aesthetic experiences of a greater
magnitude" (A 531). Beardsley thus retains the evaluative, affective,
and phenomenological features of aesthetic experience. It is, he says,
an "intrinsically enjoyable" "experience of some intensity" where
"attention" and "the succession of one's mental states" is focussed on
and directed by some phenomenal field in a way that generates a
satisfying "feeling" of coherence or "wholeness" and "a sense of
actively exercising constructive powers of the mind"(A 527;APV
287-9). And he clarifies such defining characteristics of this
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experience in considerable detail.9
After careful scrutiny, analytic aesthetics has rejected
Beardsley's theory on three major grounds. One is scepticism about
its phenomenological validity. George Dickie, the most cogent
advocate of this line of critique, offers two principal arguments. 10
First, Beardsley must be wrong to describe the aesthetic experience as
unified, coherent, etc. because doing so is simply a category mistake -
- treating the term "experience" as if it denoted a real thing that could
bear such descriptions instead of recognizing that it is merely a vague
term that denotes nothing real. Talk about aesthetic experience is just
a roundabout and ontologically inflationary way of talking about the
aesthetic object as perceived or experienced. Beardsley's claim of the
"unity of experience" is simply a misleading way of describing the
experienced, phenomenal unity of the artwork. It alone can have such
properties of coherence or wholeness. Particular subjective affects
resulting from the work cannot have these properties, and the global
aesthetic experience that purports to have them is just a linguistically
constructed metaphysical phantom. Secondly, Dickie argues that even
what is wrongly identified as aesthetic experience does not always the
affective content that Beardsley claims; and this critique can be
extended to traditional claims that aesthetic experience is always
pleasurable or unified.
What should one make of these two arguments? To the first we
can reply that empirical psychologists accept the reality of
experiences (including aesthetic ones) and the validity of describing
them in terms of predicates (like unity, intensity, etc.) that,
admittedly, are more often used to describe the objects of such
12
experiences. 11 Of course, one could challenge this response by
dismissing it as confused folk psychology and adopting the trend in
philosophy of mind toward dismissing the role of consciousness or
first-person experience. For many reasons (including aesthetic ones),
1 think this trend should be resisted, but making my case would
require too long a digression into philosophy of mind (which could
however be pursued in later discussion).12
The argument that Beardsley's phenomenological ascriptions of
affect, unity, and pleasure are in fact phenomenologically incorrect
can be considered along with the second major criticism of his theory:
that (the capacity to produce) aesthetic experience just cannot serve to
identify and demarcate works of arte Here the standard strategy is to
show that such definition would be both too wide and too narrow. It
has been charged, for instance, that by Beardsley's criteria of aesthetic
experience, good sexual experience would be falsely included as art, a
conclusion Dewey would have welcomed bllt which nlns against
Beardsley's analytic aim of explaining established classifications. 13
Most criticisms, however, focus on his definition being too narrow. It
wrongly excludes all the many artworks that are not capable of
producing enjoyable experiences of unity and affect. Some argue that
certain good works neither produce nor even try to produce such
experiences, but clearly the problem is most severe with bad works of
arte Since Beardsley's concept of aesthetic experience is essentially
honorific and definitional, it cannot accommodate bad works as
aesthetic objects or art, and yet clearly this is how we analytic
philosophers think they must be classified. The concepts of art and
aesthetic must allow for bad instances. Being a work of art cannot
13
entail being a good work of art, otherwise negative evaluations of
artworks would be impossible.
This leads to the third major difficulty: the inadequacy of
Beardsley's theory of aesthetic experience to explain our judgements
of value. Because this experience is by definition enjoyable or
positive, it can in no way aCCOllnt for strongly negative aesthetic
judgements (e.g. of hideousness, repulsion, etc.), which cannot be
explained by the mere absence of a positive aesthetic experience. Yet
negative verdicts are central to the field of aesthetics, and any concept
which claims to define this field must be able to account for bad as
weIl as good art. 14
Two conclusions emerge from all this critique. If aesthetic
experience is to do the job of demarcating the entire realm of art, then
its essentially evaluative content must be abandonned. Moreover, if
one embraces contemporary scepticism about subjectivity and
immediate feeling, then one must find a notion of aesthetic
experience not centered on first-person phenomenology but rather on
non-subjective accounts of meaning. These two inferences determine
the new semantic direction of Nelson Goodman's theory of aesthetic
experlence. Though sharing Beardsley's analytic goal of
demarcational definition, of "distinguishing in general between
aesthetic and nonaesthetic objects and experience" (LA 243), he
insists that such distinction must be "independent of all consideration
of aesthetic value", since the existence of bad art means "being
aesthetic does not exclude being... aesthetically bad"(LA 244,255).
Aesthetic experience must also be defined independent of
phenomenological accounts of mental states or immediate feelings
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and meanings. For Goodman rejects intentional entities, explaining
all meaning in terms of varieties of reference, just as he renounces the
very idea of an immediate given before or apart from its symbolic
representation. Nor can aesthetic experience be distinguished by its
peculiarly emotive character, since "some works of art have little or
no emotive content" . Even when emotion is present, its role,
Goodman argues, is simply the cognitive one "of discerning what
properties a work has and expresses" by providing "a mode of
sensitivity" to it (LA 248, 250,251), but such cognitive use of
emotion (as Dewey also tirelessly urged) is equally present in science.
Goodman concludes that while emotion is not an aesthetic constant,
cognition of some sort is. He therefore defines aesthetic experience as
"cognitive experience distinguished [from science and other domains]
by the dominance of certain symbolic characteristics"(LA 262).15
Goodman calls these features "symptoms of the aesthetic" and
individuates five of them:
"(1) syntactic density, where the finest differences in certain
respect constitute a difference between symbols -- for example,
an ungraded mercury thermometer as contrasted with an
electronic digital-read-out instrument; (2) semantic density,
where symbols are provided for things distinguished by the
finest differences in certain respects (not only the ungraduated
thermometer again but also ordinary English, though it is not
syntactically dense); (3) relative repleteness, where
comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant -for
example a single-line drawing of a mountain by Hokusai where
every feature of shape, line, thickness, etc. counts, in contrast
with perhaps the same line as achart of daily stockmarket
averages, where all that counts is the the height of the line above
the base; (4) exemplification, where a symbol, whether or not it
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denotes, symbolizes by serving as a sampIe of properties it
literally or metaphorically possesses; and finally (5) multiple and
complex reference, where a symbol performs several integrated
and interacting referential functions" (WW67-68)
If an object's "functioning exhibits all these symptoms, Goodman
claims, "then very likely the object is a work of arte If it shows almost
none, then it probably isn't" (OMM199). Although these symptoms
may fall short of being disjunctively necessary and conjunctively
sufficient conditions for defining our concept of art, Goodman blames
this on the fact that ordinary usage of this concept is too "vague and
vagrant" to allow any clear definition and thus requires reform
(WW69). His symptoms are therefore offered provisionally in the
"search for adefinition" (OMM 135) that will achieve this
clarification.
Rather than focussing on provisional symptoms, criticism of
Goodman's theory of aesthetic experience should be directed at the
underlying premises that generate their proposal. Three problems
seem most central. First is the premise of radical aesthetic
differentiation, with its consequent presumption that the function of
the concept of aesthetic experlence IS to explain art's
compartmentalized distinction. Goodman's theory, like Beardsley's, is
haunted by this goal of clearly defining art from all other realms, of
seeking (in his words) "a way of distinguishing aesthetic from all
other experience" (LA251). Thus, though keen to emphasize the great
affinities of art and science, he feels compelled to seek adefinition
that will clearly mark off aesthetic from scientific experience.
Invoking his symbolic symptoms to achieve this, he rightly worries
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that they cannot adequately do the job by providing necessary and
sufficient conditions.
Yet such worries only arise by presuming that the concept of
aesthetic experience should be coextensive with art, that aesthetic
experience cannot occur in science and other standardly non-artistic
pursuits, but must apply in all art no matter how bad. There is ample
testimony to challenge this presumption, but Goodman must ignore it.
Methodologically wedded to the project of demarcating art by
aesthetic experience, he cannot recognize a concept of aesthetic
experience that cuts across disciplinary boundaries while maintaining
its evaluative sense as enjoyably heightened, vivid, and coherently
meaningful experience. Yet such a concept exists in common usage,
not only in Dewey.
A second problem with Goodman's definition of aesthetic
experience is that it seems to render the very notion of experience --
the conscious, phenomenological feel of things -- entirely
superfluous. If the aesthetic is defined entirely in terms of the
dominance of certain modes of symbolization, with no essential
reference to sentience, immediate feeling, and affect, then what is the
point of speaking about aesthetic experience at all? We might as weIl
simply talk about the semantic symptoms of art and aesthetics, and
simply drop the term "experience" (as Goodman indeed does in his
most recent discussions). But apart from today's fashionable suspicion
of consciousness, is there any reason why the concept of aesthetic
experience must omit this phenomenological dimension with its
immediacy of quality and affect? Goodman's discussion intimates
(though never articulates) the following argument: Aesthetic
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experience is essentially meaningful and cognitive through its use of
symbols. Use of symbols implies mediation and dynamic processing
of information, while phenomenological feeling and affect implies
passivity and immediacy that cannot account for meaning. Hence,
aesthetic experience cannot be essentially phenomenological,
immediate, or affective.
This argument is very problematic. First, even assuming all its
premises, what follows is only that aesthetic experience requires more
than these phenomenological features, not that they are not central to
such experience. Secondly, we can challenge the premises by arguing
that phenomenological consciousness can include immediate
perceptions of meaning, even if such immediate understandings on
the conscious level require unconscious mediated processing or rely
on a background of past conscious mediation. Further, one can argue
that phenomenological feeling involves more than immediacy, just as
affect (on both psychological and physiologicallevels) involves more
than passivity. Finally, if Goodman brings the argument that affect is
not central to aesthetic experience because it is not always present in
the experience of artworks, we can counter by challenging the
presumption that aesthetic experience can only be llnderstood as an
artistically demarcational concept, applying necessarily to our
encounter with all (and only) artworks no matter how feeble the
encounter and the works may be.
Not only does Goodman's theory of aesthetic experience neglect
the phenomenology of experience, it is also wholly inadequate for its
designated role of demarcating the realm of arte For its use in this role
requires that we already know whether or not we are dealing with
18
artworks. Here is the argument. According to Goodman an object is
an artwork when its symbolic functioning saliently employs the
symptomatically aesthetic modes of symbolization. But an object
does not wear its symbolic use on its sleeve; a visually identical sign
may function differently in different symbolic systems. For instance,
as Goodman remarks, the same drawn line may be a replete character
artistically representing a mountain or instead a non-replete character
merely representing profits in achart. But we do not know which
symbolic functioning the object has until we know whether the object
is an artwork or just achart. Hence symbolic functioning (and thus
aesthetic experience as symbolic functioning) cannot be the basis for
defining the artistic status of an object.
This argllment is, of course, a variation of the argument from
indiscemibles, employed so powerfully by Arthur Danto to argue that
perceptual properties alone, including those involved in aesthetic
experience, are insufficient for distinguishing between artworks and
nonartworks, between Warhol's Brillo Boxes and their nonartistic
counterparts. Our experience should differ, Danto says, "depending
upon whether the response is to an artwork or to a mere real thing that
cannot be told apart form it." But "we cannot appeal to [such
differences] ...in order to get our definition of art, inasmuch as we
[first] need the definition of art in order to identify the sorts of
aesthetic responses appropriate to works of art in contrast with mere
real things"(T94). If this circularity does not altogether damn its
definitional hopes, aesthetic experience has the further problem,
Danto notes, of being traditionally defined as inherently positive,
while many artworks, being bad, induce negative responses (T92).
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Since aesthetic eXperlenCe cannot adequately demarcate art,
Danto virtually ignores it, subordinating it to another concept that he
thinks can do the definitional job (and do it with the same semantic
emphasis that Goodman advocated). This concept is interpretation.
"There is", he says "no appreciation without interpretation", since
"intepretations are what constitute works"; and "interpretation
consists in determining the relationship between a work of art and its
material counterpart" (Tl13;PD45). As I argue in "Beneath
Interpretation" 16, I think these claims are problematic. But even
granting them does not nullify the idea of aesthetic experience. Its
failure to provide a non-evaluative definition of our current concept
of art does not entail that it has no important role to play in aesthetics,
though we need, of course, to specify what role this could be.
Danto, however, suggests a further argllment. The concept of
aesthetic experience is not only useless but a "danger", because the
very notion of aesthetic intrinsically trivializes art by seeing it as "fit
only for pleasure", rather than for meaning and truth. (PDxiv, 13).
This argument not only falsely equates the aesthetic per se with the
narrowest of Kantian formalisms. It also wrongly suggests a divide
between pleasure and meaning, feeling and cognition, enjoyment and
understanding, when instead, they tend, in art, to constitute each
other. As Eliot remarked, "To understand a poem comes to the same
thing as to enjoy it for the right reasons" 17
We can reinforce this point and the centrality of aesthetic feeling
by adopting Danto's argument from indiscemibles, but applying it this
time not to objects but to subjects. Imagine two visually identical art
viewers, who offer identical interpretations of the very powerful
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paintings and poems before them. One is a human who thrills to what
he sees and interprets. The other, however, is only a cyborg who,
experiencing no qualia, feels no pleasure, indeed no emotion at all,
but merely mechanically processes the perceptual and artworld data
to deliver his interpretive output. We would surely say here that the
cyborg, in an important sense, doesn't really understand these works.
He doesn't, In a big way, get the point of such art, even if he
recognIzes that some feeling he cannot feel is somehow
appropriate,[and so is smart enough not to turn to his emotionally
moved companion (as does the cyborg in Terminator 2) asking "why
is there water on your eyes". For the point is precisely to feel or savor
art's qualia and meaning, not just computate an interpretive output
from the work's signs and artworld context.
For this reason, even if the cyborg's interpretive outputs were
descriptively more accurate than the human's, we would still say that
the human's response to art was superior and that the cyborg, since he
feels absolutely nothing, doesn't really grasp what art is all about.
Now imagine further that aesthetic experience was entirely expunged
from Ollr civilization, since we were all transformed into such cyborgs
or exterminated by them. Art might linger on a bit Ollt of inertia, but
could it continue to flourish and robustly survive? What would be the
point of creating and attending to it, if it promised no enriching
phenomenological feeling or pleasure?
The uncertainty of art's future in such a sei-ti scenario implies
the centrality of aesthetic experience -- in its evaluative and
phenomenological sense -- for the concept of arte Though surely
neither a necessary or sufticient condition for application of this
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concept, it might be regarded as a more general background condition
for arte In other words, though nlany works fail to produce aesthetic
experience -- in the sense of satisfyingly heightened, absorbing,
coherently meaningful and affective experience, if such experiences
could never be had and never had through the production of works,
art could probably never have existed.18 If artworks universally
flouted this interest (and notjust on occasion to make a radical point),
art, as we know, it would disappear. In contrast to necessary and
sufficient conditions that aim at mapping art's demarcational limits,
such a background condition concems the point rather than the
extension of the concept of arte In naming and so marking this point,
aesthetic experience is not a useless concept. 19
My futllristic cyborg parables are not so hard to imagine because
they reflect real developments in recent aesthetics and contemporary
life. Rejecting what he calls the traditional "strong and cold" "grip of
aestheticism on the philosophy of art" (PD 33), Danto joins Goodman
and many others in what might be called a radical anaestheticization
of aesthetics. FeIt experience is virtually ignored and entirely
sllbordinated to third-person semantic theories of artistic
symbolization and its interpretation. Once a potent embodiment of
art's sense and value, aesthetic experience is hermeneutered.
Forsaking such experience for semiotic definitions of art was not
merely an arbitrary whim of linguistic philosophers addicted to
semantic theory. Goodman and Danto were sensitively reflecting
developments in the artworld, which required ever more interpretion
as art became more cerebrally conceptual in pursuing what Danto
called its Hegelian quest to become its own philosophy: art as theory
22
of art. Goodman and Danto were similarly responsive to artworld
realities in claiming against Beardsley that much contemporary art
neither evokes nor aims to evoke powerful experiences having
enjoyable affect and coherent meaning.
So much the worse, one might say, for contemporary art, which
having completed its philosophical transformation and lost the
financial prop of eighties' speculation, now finds it has also lost an
experiential point and public to fall back on. For the public retains a
need for aesthetic experiences, and as these became artistically
depasse, it has learned to satisfy them outside the official realm of
contemporary art, beyond the white cube of gallery space. So
aesthetic interest is increasingly directed toward popular art, which
has not yet learned to eschew the experiential goals of pleasure,
affect, and meaningful coherence, even if it often fails to achieve
thema Mourning the artworld's loss of public, the prominent artists
Komar and Melamid (together with The Nation) commissioned a
scientific marketing-survey of popular aesthetic taste in the quest to
develop a new plastic art that would engage people as broadly and as
powerfully as popular music does. One point emerging from the
polling statistics is the demand that art provide positive affective
experience through coherence.20
Of course, the presence of such experience does not entail the
presence of art; so it cannot in itself legitimize popular art as true art,
just as it cannot alone justify the claim that a given work is good art.
In all these cases, since experience itself is mute, critical discourse is
needed. Still, the power of aesthetic experience impels one to
undertake such legitimating discourse through its feIt value, just as it
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impels the public toward the arts wherein it can be found. If the
experience has this power, the concept of such experience has value
in reminding us of it and directing us toward its use.
If art is in extremis, deprived (through completion) of its
sustaining narrative of progress and thus groping without direction in
what Danto calls its postmodern "posthistory"; if art's groping is as
lonely as it is aimless, cut off from the popular currents of taste in a
democratic culture, then the concept of aesthetic experience is worth
recalling: not for formal definition but for art's reorientation toward
values and populations that could restore its vitality and sense of
purpose.21
Art's turn from aesthetic experience is no more an act of perverse
wilfulness than Danto and Goodman's semantic anaesthetics. Like
them, contemporary artists are simply responding to changes in our
lifeworld, as we move from a more unified experiential cultllre to an
increasingly modular, informational one. This results in art that
highlights fragmentation and rapid, complex information-flow that is
often too helter-skelter to provide the coherence needed for aesthetic
experience's pleasurable sense of focussed, funded affect. Already in
the 1930's Walter Benjamin drew a stark contrast between experience
and information, expressing the fear that through the fragmentation of
modern life and the disjointed sensationalism of the newspapers, we
were losing the capacity for deep experience and feeling. Wehave
since undergone a far more extensive series of informational
revolutions - from television and facsimilie to the internet and newer
interactive systems of cyberspace and virtual reality.
Given this informational overload, it is not surprising that "the
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waning of affect" (in Fredric Jameson's phrase) is diagnosed as a
prime symptom of our postmodern condition.22 There is growing
concern, far beyond the academy, that we are being so thoroughly
reshaped by Ollr informational-technology that our experiential,
affective capacities are wearing thin, so thin that we risk assimilation
to the mechanical information processors that are already our most
intimate companions in .work and play. This worry is expressed
nowhere more clearly than in cyborg fiction. The only way of
distinguishing humans from their physically identical cyborg
Terminators or Replicants is the human capacity to feel, which itself
is continuously buffeted and jeapordized by the unmanageable flux
and grind of futuristic living. In the story of Blade Runner (though
not in the film) there is even a crucial device to reinforce these
affective experiential capacities -- an "empathy box" that produces
through virtual reality a powerful aesthetico-religious experience of
empathetic fusion with others likewise plugged in.23
It may seem very retro to suggest that aesthetic experience can
function something like an empathy box, restoring both our ability
and inclination for the sorts of vivid, moving, shared experience that
one once sought in arte Perhaps our informational evolution has
already gone too far, so that an evening of beauty at the Met can do
nothing to counter a life on Wall Street's chaotic trading floor.
Perhaps aesthetic experience, and not just the philosophical value of
its concept, has almost reached its end. How could philosophy
do anything to forestall its totalloss?
Aesthetic experience will be strengthened and preserved the
more it is experienced; it will be more experienced, the more we are
25
directed to such experience; and one good way of directing us to such
experience is fuller recognition of its importance and richness through
greater attention to the concept of aesthetic experience. We thus find
at least one good use for philosophical recognition of this concept: its
orientation toward having the experience it names. Rather than
defining art or justifying critical vericts, the concept is directional,
reminding us of what is worth seeking in art and elsewhere in life.
Wittgenstein said: "The work of the philosopher consists in
assembling reminders for a particular purpose. ,,24 If the same holds
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